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ABSTRACT  
Introduction: Generating country-level political commitment will be critical to driving forward action 
throughout the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016-2025). In this review of the empirical 
nutrition policy literature we ask: what factors generate, sustain and constrain political commitment for 
nutrition, how, and under what circumstances? Our aim is to inform strategic ‘commitment-building’ 
actions. 
Method: We adopted a framework synthesis method and realist review protocol. An initial framework 
was derived from relevant theory and then populated with empirical evidence to test and modify it. Five 
steps were undertaken: initial theoretical framework development; search for relevant empirical literature; 
study selection and quality appraisal; data extraction, analysis and synthesis; and framework 
modification.  
Results: 75 studies were included. We identified 18 factors that drive commitment, organized into five 
categories: actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; knowledge, evidence and framing; and 
capacities and resources. Irrespective of country-context, effective nutrition actor networks, strong 
leadership, civil society mobilization, supportive political administrations, societal change and focusing 
events, cohesive and resonant framing, and robust data systems and available evidence, were commitment 
drivers. Low and middle-income country studies also frequently reported international actors, empowered 
institutions, vertical coordination, and capacities and resources. In upper-middle and high-income country 
studies private sector interference frequently undermined commitment. 
Conclusion: Political commitment is not something that simply exists or emerges accidentally; it can be 
created and strengthened over time through strategic action. Successfully generating commitment will 
likely require a ‘core set’ of actions with some context-dependent adaptations. Ultimately, it will 
necessitate strategic actions by cohesive, resourced and strongly-led nutrition actor networks that are 
responsive to the multi-factorial, multi-level and dynamic political systems in which they operate and 
attempt to influence. Accelerating the formation and effectiveness of such networks over the Nutrition 
Decade should be a core task for all actors involved. 
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List of acronyms 
DFID Department for International Development  
HIC High-income country 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
LIC Low-income country 
LMIC Lower-middle income country 
NCD Noncommunicable disease 
NGO Non-government organization 
NAN Nutrition actor network 
RAMESES  Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses: Evolving Standards 
UMIC Upper-middle income country 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WHO World Health Organization 
What is already known about this topic? 
 Global-level ambition for tackling ‘malnutrition in all its forms’ is strong – the declaration of 
2016-2025 as the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (the Nutrition Decade) and the 
adoption of Sustainable Development Goal 2 Target 2.2 (ending all forms of malnutrition by 
2030) are testament to this. 
 Without political commitment at the country-level, however, the policies, programmes and 
resources required to reduce and eliminate malnutrition in all its forms are unlikely to be adopted, 
effectively implemented, and sustained.  
 However, the factors that influence political commitment for nutrition are poorly understood, 
thus limiting the potential for strategic ‘commitment-building’ actions by nutrition actors over 
the Nutrition Decade. 
What are the new findings? 
 In this review of the empirical nutrition policy literature, we ask the question: what factors 
generate, sustain and constrain political commitment for nutrition within countries, how, and 
under what circumstances? 
 Overall, 18 factors were identified as driving political commitment, organized into five 
categories: actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; knowledge, evidence and framing; 
and capacities and resources.  
 The identified factors functioned in strongly interdependent and context-dependent ways, 
supporting the need to understand the drivers of political commitment within a non-linear and 
dynamic model of change.  
How might this influence practice? 
 Effective strategies for generating and sustaining commitment over the Nutrition Decade are 
likely to involve a set of core actions but with some context-dependent adaptations. 
 Ultimately, sustained actions by cohesive, responsive and strongly-led nutrition actor networks 
with the strategic and organizational capacities for commitment-building are needed.  
 Accelerating the development of such networks should be a core task for all actors involved, 
including international development partners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Malnutrition – “an abnormal physiological condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced or excessive 
consumption of macronutrients and/or micronutrients”1, p53 – is a leading driver of global death and 
disability. In 2014, 462 million adults were underweight, 2 billion micronutrient deficient, and 1.9 billion 
overweight or obese.2 In 2016, stunting (low height for age) affected 155 million children under-five, 
wasting (low weight for height) 52 million, and overweight (high weight for height) a further 41 million.3 
In 2011, nutrition-related factors contributed to 3.1 million or 45% of all deaths in children under-five.3 
In short, malnutrition affects one in three people in the world and leaves no nation untouched.4 
The global nutrition situation is becoming more complex. Rapid nutritional change in many countries is 
precipitating a ‘double-burden’ of malnutrition, with high rates of undernutrition co-existing with 
overweight, obesity and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) within populations, households 
and individuals.4 5 People who are malnourished are more likely to die younger, suffer disability, live in 
poverty, have impaired physical and cognitive development, and reduced performance at school and 
work.4 Conversely, good nutrition provides a bedrock for the economic and social development of 
nations;  all of the Sustainable Development Goals both influence, and are influenced by, nutrition.  
Global-level ambition for tackling ‘malnutrition in all its forms’ is strong. The declaration of 2016-2025 
as the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (the Nutrition Decade) and the positioning of 
nutrition within Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Target 2.2 is ending all forms of malnutrition by 2030) 
are testament to this. These build upon the World Health Assembly’s six targets on maternal, infant and 
young child nutrition and targets on diet-related NCDs (together: the ‘global targets’). The technical 
solutions for achieving these goals and targets exist, including nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive 
interventions that are cost-effective and backed by evidence.6  
Converting global ambition into on-the-ground reductions in malnutrition will, however, require more 
than technical know-how. It will also demand ‘political commitment’ for the sustained mobilization of 
national and sub-national political systems, policy processes, and resources for improved nutrition.4 7-9 
The Global Nutrition Report and other monitoring efforts reveal the scope of this challenge – some 
countries are making progress towards achieving the global targets (particularly on child stunting and 
wasting), but the large majority are off-track due to shortfalls in governance, policy and programming 
responses.4 10 In essence, there is a significant gap between current levels of commitment and that needed 
to drive coherent action for achieving results.4 
A growing body of empirical research, much of it grounded in political science, describes why and how 
nutrition has come to receive political commitment in some jurisdictions but has been neglected or 
systematically ignored in others. Important reviews of this literature exist, focusing on specific nutrition 
issues or country-contexts.e.g. 8 9 11 12 With an aim of informing ‘commitment-building’ actions over the 
Nutrition Decade, we extend this earlier work by reviewing and synthesising the literature relevant to all 
forms of malnutrition and country-contexts. We ask the question: what factors generate, sustain and 
constrain political commitment for nutrition within countries, how, and under what circumstances?  
Defining political commitment 
We adopt a definition of political commitment as “the intent and sustained actions over time by societal 
actors to achieve the objective of reducing and eliminating the manifestations and causes of 
[malnutrition]”.13, p282 Or more simply, it is “the will to act and keep on acting until the job is done”.7, pXIV 
From this perspective, achieving political commitment is more than generating attention to malnutrition 
or getting it onto a government agenda. It further involves the mobilisation of political systems and 
institutions, adopting policies, allocating resources and coordinating responses for as long as necessary 
to ensure results.7 9 13-15  
Five inter-related forms of commitment can be identified in the literature on nutrition’s political economy 
(Table 1). ‘Commitment-building’, the non-linear and dynamic process by which commitment is 
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generated7, occurs through the deliberate actions of ‘nutrition actor networks’ – the individuals and 
organizations operating within a jurisdiction with a shared interest in attenuating malnutrition and who 
act collectively to do so.9 15 Such networks may be considered ‘effective’ when they are capable of 
generating and sustaining rhetorical, institutional and operational forms of commitment, leveraging 
embedded commitments, and ultimately achieving commitment that is system-wide.15  
Table 1. Five forms of political commitment 
Form Description 
[1] Rhetorical 
commitment 
Statements made by members of the executive and legislative branches of government, and/or 
those outside of government with whom they are closely associated (e.g. donors, civil society 
leaders) recognising malnutrition as a serious problem, and that concerted action is both needed 
and forthcoming.7 15-18 A rhetorical commitment may be a ‘symbolic gesture’ only, especially 
when the political costs of inaction are low. Or, when genuine, such commitments may reach a 
government’s ‘decision-agenda’ and be converted into [2] via directives for governmental and 
societal action. 
[2] Institutional 
commitment 
The conversion of [1] into substantive policy infrastructure including institutions responsible 
for coordinating actions, the adoption of enabling legislation, policies and policy instruments 
commensurate with the severity of the problem,16 18 and the commitment of mid-level 
bureaucrats responsible for coordinating action.7 18 19 Institutions and policies can, however, be 
under-powered, inadequately-resourced and have limited impact. This can trap nutrition in a 
‘low-priority’ cycle as “lack of commitment breeds lack of impact breeds lack of 
commitment”.7, p7  
[3] Operational 
commitment 
The conversion of [1] + [2] into on-the-ground actions including the sustained allocation of 
human, technical and financial resources, the effective coordination of all actors involved along 
national to sub-national implementation pathways, and the commitment of street-level managers 
and implementation teams.16 18 20 Limited operational commitment can lead to implementation 
failure, thereby undermining sustained commitment and further trapping nutrition in a low-
priority cycle.7  
[4] Embedded 
commitment 
When commitment to address issues indirectly related to nutrition (e.g. economic development, 
social protection. hunger reduction initiatives) inadvertently achieves positive nutrition 
outcomes, referred to as “nutrition success without nutrition-specific action”.21, p26 This can 
create opportunities for nutrition actors when they are capable of sensitising or positioning 
nutrition within these broader or related policy agendas, thus further catalysing the commitment-
building process and forms [1-3].20 21 
[5] System-wide 
commitment 
The achievement of [1] + [2] + [3] + [4] involving all actors operating within a nutrition system 
including communities, families and individual citizens.7 15 When achieved, system-wide 
commitment can create a powerful reinforcing feedback-loop that institutionalises and sustains 
long-term policy and programme responses. To be effective efforts must be sustained and re-
calibrated in response to emerging opposition and demands, changing conditions and 
implementation challenges.7 13 15 
 
METHODS  
Review method 
We made several considerations in selecting the review method: the complex nature of political systems, 
the theoretically guided qualitative case study designs typically used in food and nutrition political 
analyses, and our aim of describing the multi-factorial, inter-dependent and context-dependent drivers of 
political commitment rather than a simple description of listed variables. On this basis we adopted a 
framework synthesis method22 23 suitable for reviewing qualitative research on applied policy topics, and 
adapted the RAMESES standards for reporting purposes.24 25  
This involved formulating a theoretical framework of factors influencing political commitment and 
modifying it in response to extracted data to result in a revised framework including modified and new 
factors. We proceeded via five steps: i) Development of a framework integrating several ‘middle-range 
theories’ on the determinants of political commitment; ii) A search for relevant empirical literature; iii) 
Study selection and quality appraisal; iv) Extracting, analysing and synthesising data; and v) Populating 
and modifying the framework. A review protocol was registered (PROSPERO 2016:CRD42016046015).  
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Initial theoretical framework development 
A scoping review of scholarly and grey literature was undertaken in July 2016 to identify relevant 
theories, to explicate the phenomena under study and identify search terms. To guide our initial 
conceptualisation and to guide the analysis we drew upon three complementary ‘middle-range’ 
frameworks often applied in nutrition policy research: Kingdon’s multiple streams theory,17 Shiffman and 
Smith’s health priority-setting framework,14 and Heaver’s work on political commitment for nutrition.7 
These were integrated into an initial theoretical framework (Supplementary Text 1).  
Search for relevant empirical literature 
To optimise search strings, we undertook preliminary searches of the PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest and 
Web of Science databases using combinations of terms and database parameters (Table 2). These 
databases were selected for their relevance and comprehensiveness after consultation with two librarians 
trained in systematic search. A search diary was kept to record progress and modifications to the protocol 
(Supplementary Text 2). We conducted a search for primary literature between August and October 2016. 
Acknowledging the large ‘practice-orientated’ grey literature on nutrition policy we also searched the 
websites of international organizations with a mandate to address malnutrition in October 2016 (Table 2). 
To capture studies missed in the initial search, additional searches were conducted in February 2017.  
Table 2. Databases and websites searched, search terms, and inclusion / exclusion criteria 
Search Databases / institutional websites Search terms 
Scholarly literature  PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest, Web of Science Nutrition-related: diet*, food*, hunger, 
micronutrient deficienc*, nourish*, 
*nutrition*, obesity, overweight, stunting, 
underweight, wasting 
Grey literature Eldis; Food & Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations; Institute for Development 
Studies; International Food Policy Research 
Institute; International Fund for Agricultural 
Development; Oxfam International; Save the 
Children; Scaling-up Nutrition; United Nations 
Children’s Fund; United Nations Standing 
Committee on Nutrition; World Bank; World 
Food Programme; World Health Organization. 
Political commitment related: accountabilit*, 
advoca*, agenda*, capacit*, collective 
action, commit*, coordination, enabling 
environment*, govern*, politic*, policy, 
policies, priorit*, stewardship, strateg* 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Studies were 
included if: 
1. Published after 1990 in English.  
2. Published in a peer-reviewed journal or by an official organization or non-government 
organization with a mandate to address malnutrition. 
3. Identified and described factors shaping political commitment for nutrition at national 
and/or sub-national levels.  
4. Involved an empirical analysis with clearly described aims, explicit use of theory or 
description of underlying assumptions, a clear study design and methodology including 
data sources, coherent statement of findings and justifiable conclusions. 
Studies were 
excluded if: 
1. Non-empirical (e.g. commentaries, conceptual frameworks, calls to action). 
2. Focused on specific institutional (e.g. school, prisons and workplaces) or clinical policy-
settings (i.e. not at jurisdictional level). 
* Truncated to capture all variations of the word (e.g. *nutrition* captures mal-, over- and under-nutrition) 
Selecting studies and quality appraisal 
References for all studies were entered into an EndNote library. Studies were selected against the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria in Table 2. Study quality was appraised by relevance to the review aim 
(inclusion criterion three) and robustness (criterion four). A diagram of the search process is given in 
Figure 1. To check for inter-assessor reliability PB and KW independently screened a sample of records 
by title, abstract, and full text (Supplementary Text 2). The final list of included articles was approved by 
all authors. 
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Figure 1. The search process 
 
Data extraction, analysis and synthesis 
Data were extracted in two steps. First, PB read all full texts and extracted basic data into an Excel 
(Microsoft) spreadsheet: study characteristics (authors, year, title, aims/objectives, policy focus, theory 
used, study design, methods, data sources, funding source); setting (focal nutrition issue, geographical 
level, jurisdiction name, income-level); outcomes (study conclusions/key findings, commitment 
outcome). Second, studies were coded in ATLAS.ti (Scientific Software GmbH) using a coding schema 
derived from the initial framework and refined abductively using constant comparative analysis whereby 
the coded concepts were confirmed, integrated, modified and/or added to through iterations of data 
analysis.26  
Data were then synthesised. First, text associated with each code was read in-situ by PB and summarised, 
including: i) a definition of each factor, identified as what influenced commitment; ii) the mechanism(s) 
associated with it, identified as underlying entities, structures or processes that transmitted a causal force 
between the factor and political commitment (either stated in the study or inferred)27; and, iii) co-factors 
that amplified, diminished, and/or sustained the mechanism. On this basis, we defined ‘context’ as 
‘underlying social, economic and physical phenomena’ influencing how the mechanism functioned to 
generate an outcome.28 Second, any co-factors missed in the first step were identified using the ATLAS.ti 
code co-occurrence tool.  
Populating and modifying the framework  
The synthesised data corresponding to modified or new factors were populated into the thematic 
categories of the framework to generate the final version.22 All authors reviewed iterations of the results 
and final tables. 
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RESULTS 
Description of included studies 
A total of 75 studies were included (Supplementary Text 3). There was an upsurge in publications per 
year in the 2006-2017 period, likely reflecting increased attention to nutrition’s political economy. By 
World Bank country income status, studies spanned 31 (38%) high-income (HICs), 13 (16%) upper-
middle-income (UMICs), 22 (27%) lower-middle (LMICs), and 15 (18%) low-income (LICs) countries. 
By issue, 6 (8%) focused on food security, 22 (30%) on general malnutrition, 2 (3%) on micronutrient 
deficiencies, 28 (38%) on overweight/obesity and diet-related NCDs, and 16 (22%) on undernutrition. 
Overweight/obesity and diet-related NCDs was the predominant focus in HICs and UMICs studies, and 
undernutrition in LMICs and LICs. Only one study explicitly focused on the double-burden of 
malnutrition. 
By jurisdictional level 51 (68%) involved national jurisdictions, 17 (23%) sub-national 
(region/province/state), and 4 (5%) sub-national (local/municipal). A small number involved multi-level 
jurisdictions; 2 (3%) national and sub-national (regional), and 1 (1%) national and supra-national. 25 
frameworks, theories and models were identified across the included studies. 10 (14%) used the multiple 
streams theory, 9 (12%) a governance framework, 6 (8%) framing theory, 6 (8%) Shiffman and Smith’s 
framework, 5 (7%) Clark’s policy science framework, 4 (5%) the advocacy coalition framework, and 4 
(5%) the enabling environments for nutrition framework (6%). 24 (32%) adopted a theoretically 
pluralistic approach that integrated two or more theories.  
Factors generating, sustaining and constraining political commitment 
As described in Table 3, a total of 18 factors were identified as driving commitment, organized into five 
themes: actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; knowledge evidence and framing; and 
capacities and resources. These were conceptualised as increasing or decreasing the ‘probability’ of 
political commitment, rather than in terms of ‘necessity’ or ‘sufficiency’.14 A more elaborate 
representation of these factors is given in Tables S4.1-4.5 (Supplementary Text 4). As demonstrated by 
the co-factors column in these tables, the determinants of commitment identified were dynamic, strongly 
interdependent and context-dependent.  
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Table 3. Factors identified as driving political commitment for nutrition 
Category Factor and description 
Actors (1) Nutrition actor network (NAN) effectiveness: Effectiveness of NANs, the individuals and organizations operating within a given jurisdiction who 
shared common principles, causal beliefs, and/or interest in tackling malnutrition and who acted collectively to do so.14 17 29 
 (2) Strength of leadership: Presence of committed and politically savvy individuals, within or outside of government, recognised as strong champions for 
nutrition.7 14 17 30 
 (3) Civil society mobilization: Extent to which civil society groups mobilized to address malnutrition, including non-government organizations and social 
movements collectively representing the interests of citizens.7 14 
 (4) Supportive international actors: Degree to which actors with an international scope of operations and/or membership initiated, championed and/or 
supported nutrition policy and programming responses.14 31 
 (5) Private sector interference: Degree to which mobilized private interest groups undermined effective nutrition policy responses, including food 
producers, retailers, marketers and their representative peak bodies.32 33 
Institutions (6) Strength of institutions: Extent to which coordinating agencies and institutional systems mandated to address malnutrition were empowered to 
effectively coordinate multi-sector/-level responses and advocate for sustained attention and resources.7 14 21 34 
 (7) Effective vertical coordination: Degree to which nutrition policies were effectively coordinated, implemented and monitored across levels of 
governance, particularly regarding the incentives of sub-national actors to adopt, progress and benefit from central government policies.20 35-37 
 (8) Legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks: Degree to which national nutrition policies, operational plans and enabling legislation were well-
designed and enacted, and/or the alignment of nutrition objectives with broader policy agendas and regulatory frameworks.38-40 
Political and societal 
contexts 
(9) Supportive political administrations: Degree to which members of the executive (e.g. head of state, ministers), legislative (e.g. parliamentarians), and 
administrative (e.g. agency heads, senior officials) branches of government initiated and championed nutrition responses.12 20 41  
 (10) Societal conditions and focusing events: Extent to which changing societal conditions (long-duration phenomena) or focusing events (short-term 
processes) focused attention onto nutrition or closely related issues and presented opportunities or impediments to commitment-building.14 17 31 42 43 
 (11) Ideology and institutional norms: Extent to which entrenched belief systems and practices predominant within political systems, policy-making 
institutions, and/or in society-at-large, negatively skewed perceptions about malnutrition problems and undermined effective policy responses.15 17 29 32 44 45 
Knowledge, evidence 
and framing 
(12) Credible indicators and data systems: Availability of credible indicators and high-quality data systems for monitoring nutrition problems, informing 
policy design, tracking progress and empowering accountability systems.7 14 15 20 21 
 (13) Evidence: Extent to which robust evidence on the causes, manifestations and consequences of malnutrition and the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
interventions was available, clearly communicated and accepted.14 32 46 
 (14) Internal frame alignment: Degree to which NANs were aligned around a common interpretation and narrative of a given malnutrition problem 
including its definition, magnitude, causes and solutions for resolving it.14 29 31 37 42  
 (15) External frame resonance: Degree to which NANs publicly portrayed (i.e. framed) nutrition problems and solutions in ways that resonated with and 
motivated action by external audiences, and countered the frames deployed by opponents.14 17 20 31 32 42 
Capacities and 
resources 
(16) Strategic capacities: Degree to which NAN members possessed ‘soft-power’ skills including the capacity to generate consensus, resolve conflicts, 
respond to recurring opportunities and challenges, build strategic alliances, undertake strategic communications and related tasks.7 42  
 (17) Organizational capacities: Degree to which NAN members possesssed the technical knowledge and skills, administrative systems, and human 
resources required to generate commitment, including through the effective management of nutrition policy and programming responses.7 15 18 42 
 (18) Financial resources: Degree to which nutrition budgetary commitments and financing systems incentivised multi-sector/-level coordination, ensured 
successful policy implementation, and created ownership and entitlements among political elites, policy-makers, citizens and other stakeholders.7 20 
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Actors 
Irrespective of country context effective nutrition actor networks (NANs) (Factor 1) generated 
commitment through inter alia advocacy and awareness-raising, framing nutrition problems and 
solutions (i.e. norm promotion), generating data and evidence, coordinating policy development, 
implementation and monitoring activities, building capacities and mobilizing resources.18 29-32 37 41-43 47-
61 Such networks varied widely in structure (formal vs. informal), maturity (nascent vs highly evolved) 
and membership composition including parliamentarians, bureaucrats, academics, international 
agencies and civil society representatives.18 29-32 37 41-43 47-61 Their effectiveness was enhanced in the 
context of high cohesion among members37 41 43 54-61, strong leadership58-60, and when possessing 
strategic and organizational capacities.29 37 44 51 57 62 63 Conflict and fragmentation within NANs was, 
however, frequently reported resulting from many topics of disagreement.12 16 29 32 47 48 50 54 
Nutrition leaders (Factor 2), including those within and outside of government enabled commitment in 
many studies through establishing, unifying and mobilizing NANs, championing policy ideas and 
engaging with decision-makers.15 18 20 21 37 43 50 55 58-60 64-69 They included advocates promoting external 
attention to nutrition, policy entrepreneurs (e.g. who ‘softened-up’ technical communities to political 
realities, built consensus and advocated policy ideas), and high-level political champions.12 18 30 31 34 38 44 
54 55 57 58 60-62 64-67 69-72 Their leadership was enhanced when possessing certain strategic capacities (e.g. 
emotional intelligence, management, communication, negotiation and conflict management skills)18 30 
42 50 55 57 59 60 64 65, they had the support of high-level political champions30 64 65, and when elected or 
appointed into positions of authority (e.g. as legislators or high-level bureaucrats).18 21 50 55 57 59 60 67 73  
The mobilization of civil society groups (Factor 3), including a diversity of international and national 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements (e.g. health-orientated, disease-
specific, faith-based, consumer-focused), was often integral to NAN formation, development and 
impact. Groups varied in their expertise, available resources and functional roles.20 21 30 31 37 41-43 59 60 70 74-
77 Their activities included advocacy, awareness-raising and coalition-building, acting as an 
accountability mechanism (e.g. by monitoring and reporting on government and other stakeholder 
activities), giving voice to the politically marginalised, delivering on-the-ground services, and 
informing policy development, monitoring and calibration.20 21 30 31 37 41-43 59 60 70 74-77 Civil society impact 
was enhanced when supported by the media31 65 and international actors21 37 78, and when inclusive 
governance arrangements linked policy-makers with civil society groups and policy beneficiaries.20 21 
39 41 44 56 59 72 
In several LIC and MIC studies, supportive international actors (Factor 4) enabled commitment by 
mobilizing resources for policy, programming and capacity-building20 37 38 44 65 71 79, providing technical 
assistance and legitimacy to policy initiatives12 30 34 57 58, and by advocating to governments.21 29 44 57 58 
They included multi-lateral organizations (e.g. WHO, UNICEF, World Bank), donor agencies (e.g. 
USAID, DFID) and global nutrition initiatives (e.g. Scaling Up Nutrition).15 21 38 53 56-58 65 67 71 75 In some 
cases policy and programming was almost entirely donor-driven.38 71 79 The role of international actors 
was weakened when their actions were misaligned with government priorities18 20 29 42, when the absence 
of coherent government policies, coordinating structures and accountability mechanisms encouraged 
donors to ‘go it alone’52 78, and when recipient governments became over-dependent on donor 
financing.53 54 71  
In many MIC and HIC studies, private sector interference (Factor 5) impeded commitment for food 
regulations targeting obesity prevention by inter alia undermining policy debates (e.g. by emphasising 
individual or parental responsibility, disputing evidence, intervention as ‘nanny-statist’), pre-emptively 
adopting self-regulation (i.e. policy substitution), and direct lobbying of policy-makers.19 32 33 46 49 50 80-84 
This was enhanced in the context of a neoliberal ideology19 32 40 49 85 86 including a shift towards hybrid 
(i.e. public-private) governance arrangements that expanded private-interest influence in public policy19 
32 49 83 85 87, the food industry’s ‘productivist power’ as suppliers of jobs and tax revenue21 32 49, and greater 
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international capital mobility (i.e. via trade liberalization) allowing transnational corporations to punish 
or reward governments for their policy decisions.66 83 In some LIC and MIC studies, agricultural 
subsidies, tax concessions and ‘pork-barrelling’ may have created powerful private-interest 
constituencies resisting nutrition-sensitive agriculture and food distribution policy change.20 31 38 78 88 
Institutions 
Tackling malnutrition requires coordinated action and commitment within and across multiple sectors 
(horizontal coordination) and levels (vertical coordination) of governance. The complex institutional 
arrangements involved, the absence of ‘institutional ownership’ for nutrition, and institutional failure 
often impeded this.15 18 20 30 31 34 38 44 54 59 75 The establishment of empowered coordinating agencies and 
institutional systems with a mandate to address malnutrition (Factor 6) was important in overcoming 
these challenges through inter alia providing structures for convening stakeholders, coordinating multi-
sector/-level policy development, implementation and monitoring activities, and mobilizing human, 
technical and financial resources.20 29 31 34 41 54 57 58 65 This often centrally involved the health and 
agricultural sectors, but also inter alia education, gender, labour, finance, economic development, 
industry, water and sanitation, social protection and trade.18 20 34 35 38 41 58 63 69 75 77 89 90 
Coordinating agencies were typically located within supra-sectoral agencies (e.g. office of the prime 
minister) or line agencies (e.g. ministry of health, agriculture)21 31 57 58, and embedded within wider  
multi-sector/-level institutional systems with delineated roles and responsibilities.18 21 41 57 59 Agencies 
were more often effective when positioned supra-sectorally and possessing sufficient capacities, 
resources and leadership12 18 21 65 75 77, and when institutional systems had strong multi-sector/-level 
cooperation incentives (e.g. enabling legislation, policies and plans, shared and sector-specific goals, 
performance measures, and performance and/or results based budgeting systems).21 38 39 57 75 Institutional 
failure resulted from inter alia insufficient authority, capacities and resources (often when located 
within politically weak line ministries)20 21 31 38 53 57 77 78, an over-focus on technical or implementation 
activities to the neglect of advocacy18 21 34, and inter-organizational competition.18 34 53 
Vertical coordination presented a significant challenge given the many actors involved in policy and 
programming activities within and across levels of governance.12 18 20 29 32 35-38 53 71 77 79 80 91 Effective 
vertical coordination (Factor 7) was important for incentivising actions, building ownership, and driving 
coordinated action along national to sub-national ‘implementation pathways’.20 21 35-37 39 71 This was 
enhanced through strong cooperation incentives (e.g. legislation requiring multi-level cooperation, 
resource transfers, and performance and/or results based budgeting)20 21 39, and sub-national institutional 
structures with sufficient capacities and resources.20 21 37 71 Decentralisation processes underway in many 
countries increased the power of sub-national stakeholders, making their involvement in centralised 
policy processes critical20 21 29 34 62 71, and their exclusion detrimental.20 38 52 71 75 In some cases, 
decentralisation also undermined the authority of centralised coordinating agencies.29 34 53 57 62 71 
The development and adoption of national nutrition policies, operational plans and enabling legislation 
(Factor 8) enabled commitment by demonstrating commitments to which governments could be held 
accountable, enabling beliefs on the need for coordinated action within government, and by providing 
a framework for action.15 21 38 39 60 71 75 77 Commitment was further enhanced when nutrition was 
positioned within broader national development plans, social welfare reforms and/or poverty reduction 
strategies18 21 37 59 66 74, when global-level policies and/or commitments compelled national governments 
to initiate responses20 56 57 67 71 92, and when policies had clear numerical commitments that enhanced 
accountability.20 38 93 It was diminished when nutrition was excluded or marginalised from broader 
policy agendas34 38 94, and when there was limited capacity to achieve consensus among stakeholders 
during policy processes.15 42 51 72  
Political and societal contexts 
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Political administrations, including the executive, legislative and administrative branches of 
government were often the primary power structures shaping nutrition responses at all levels. 
Supportive political administrations (Factor 9) enabled commitment by articulating policy debates, 
championing policy initiatives, facilitating inclusive policy processes (e.g. public consultations), 
drafting policy and legislation, providing institutional memory, and enhancing accountability through 
oversight of policy initiatives, agencies and expenditures.12 20 37 41 59 This was more likely with the 
election or electoral continuity of governments with strong social welfare and anti-poverty agendas12 18 
20 21 31 39 52 56 59 65 66, when actions were taken to build non-partisan (i.e. multi-party or multi-faction) 
coalitions for nutrition, and when parliamentarians were actively involved in policy processes.20 41 57  
Unsupportive political administrations were frequently reported.20 29 37 38 52 59 65 77 86 94 In several cases 
rhetorical commitments by members of the executive branch were not converted into directives for 
legislative and administrative enactment.15 18 20 21 78 This was more likely in the context of weak electoral 
demand and/or civil society pressure (i.e. reducing the political costs of inaction)20 29 38 52 59 65 77 94,  the 
low-level visibility of nutrition and poor nutritional literacy among parliamentarians, administrators and 
citizens15 52 53 62 71 74, when attention to nutrition was eclipsed by more tangible ‘vote-winning’ issues18 34 
38 52 54 56 57 62 71 75, and in highly partisan, fragmented or unstable political environments.52 91 In some HIC 
studies commitment for food regulations targeting obesity prevention was undermined by the election 
of, or congressional control by, more right-wing (e.g. liberal-conservative) governments.32 49 50 68 
Long-term changes in societal conditions and short-term focusing events (Factor 11) presented 
opportunities or challenges for generating commitment by influencing many aspects of government 
policy agendas and by focusing public and political attention directly onto or away from nutrition and/or 
closely-related issues.31 42 43 72 Examples of these are given in Table 4. Some focusing events (e.g. 
famines) were detrimental when they focused attention onto and institutionalised food production and 
distribution responses at the expense of broader (i.e. nutrition-sensitive) and longer-term responses to 
undernutrition42. Changing societal conditions and focusing events were more likely to advance 
commitment when NANs had sufficient foresight, leadership, and capacities to take advantage of 
emerging opportunities or mitigate threats.42 72  
Table 4. Changing societal conditions and focusing events as commitment-building opportunities or 
challenges 
Type Identified examples presenting opportunities (↑) or challenges (↓) 
Societal conditions: Long-
duration phenomena that 
influenced many aspects of 
government policy agendas that 
were directly or indirectly 
related to nutrition42 43.  
↑ Long-term trends in population health, food systems change and nutrition 
status (e.g. epidemiological transition, nutrition transition)32 51 67; ↑ Transition to 
democracy enabling more socially-orientated policies59 74; ↑ Economic growth 
enabling greater resources for nutrition budgetary commitments31 65. ↓ Sustained 
conflict/insecurity;53 58 78 92 95 ↓ Weak government revenue-raising capacity 
constraining nutrition budgetary commitments20 31 68 76 78; ↓ Widespread 
corruption and embezzlement20 31 76; ↓ Economic downturn/austerity reducing 
support for food regulations targeting obesity prevention due to perceived 
costs/impacts on food industry.32 43 48 68 
Focusing events: Short-
duration processes that focused 
attention directly onto nutrition 
or indirectly by association to 
closely related issues31 42. 
↑ Famines, natural disasters, political upheavals and economic crises15 42 53 65 71 
72 92; ↑ High-profile and/or consistent media coverage12 19 31 46 50 55 65 71 76 77 87; ↑↓ 
Political developments including changes within the executive, legislative 
and/or administrative branches of government, government planning cycles, 
high-level speeches/debates, and ratifying international agreements12 14 17 31 32 38 
41 66 67; ↑ Emergence of broader policy discourses that nutrition actors could 
sensitise (e.g. HIV/AIDS, Millennium Development Goal implementation, 
primary health care, poverty reduction)42 65 69; ↑ Direct actions of nutrition actors 
(e.g. high-profile events, publishing reports).15 31 57 ↓ Famines, natural disasters, 
political upheavals, economic downturn and other crises when institutionalising 
food distribution responses that excluded nutrition42. 
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Certain belief systems (Factor 12) entrenched within political systems, policy-making institutions, 
and/or in society-at-large were found to narrow or skew perceptions about the scale, scope and nature 
of nutrition problems thereby impeding commitment for more balanced policy responses addressing the 
wider determinants of malnutrition.15 29 32 44 45 85 Three were most evident as described in Table 5. In 
primarily HIC studies a ‘neoliberal ideology’ was found to skew overweight/obesity responses towards 
behavioural-lifestyle and market-driven (i.e. industry-led) approaches with a limited role for 
government and legislative intervention.19 32 40 43 49 66 85 86 In several LIC and MICs a ‘food-centric’ belief 
system was found to orientate policy responses towards agricultural production, food distribution and 
hunger reduction to the exclusion of nutrition.13 15 21 31 38 42 62 65 71 76 77 94 A ‘nutri-centric’ belief system 
skewed undernutrition responses towards nutrition-specific and/or curative/biomedical interventions to 
the neglect of nutrition-sensitive ones.20 21 38 52 58 71 
Table 5. Prominent belief systems skewing nutrition responses and undermining commitment 
Belief system Reinforcing or associated factors 
Neoliberalism: An ideology emphasising 
market freedom, minimal government 
intervention, devolved governance 
including ‘self-governance’ by the 
individual, and an expanded role for 
market actors in all spheres of political, 
economic and social activity.19 85 
Behavioural-lifestyle approaches to nutrition that download 
responsibility onto individuals or parents rather than powerful 
governments and/or food industry actors19 32 43 49 66 85; An expanded 
role for the private sector in policy and governance19 32 49 85; Belief 
that government should have no or only a minimal role in regulating 
free markets and enterprise19 32 40 49 86; Deregulation agendas within 
government including regulatory impact assessments (i.e. assessing 
new regulatory proposals for costs to business) with stringent 
evidential requirements.40 84 
Nutri-centrism: A curative, biomedical or 
nutrient-centric view of nutrition 
emphasising nutrition-specific or 
reductionist interventions to the neglect of 
integrated, preventative or  nutrition-
sensitive ones.20 21 38 52 58 
Placement of nutrition within ministries of health resulting in an over-
emphasis on nutrition-specific programming20 38 52 58 71; Prevailing 
narratives at international level (i.e. nutrition faddism) narrowing the 
scope of national nutrition responses (e.g. over-emphasis on 
micronutrients)42; Civil society groups becoming fixated on single 
issues and presenting ideological resistant to alternatives31 52; 
Generally, an overly-technical or reductionist approach to nutrition 
disconnected from the “messiness of real decision-making”, 
particularly when nutrition actors failed to manage conflicts arising 
from divergent values, perspectives or interests of a non-technical 
nature.12 18 31 51 
Food-centrism: The conflation of 
“malnutrition with lack of food”.42, pS62 
Also: the conflation of food security with 
nutrition security or the conflation of a 
“commitment to fight hunger with 
combatting undernutrition”.13, p280  
Focusing events (e.g. drought, famine, economic crises) that 
stimulated and institutionalised food distribution and emergency food 
responses at the expense of longer-term ‘development nutrition’20 30 
38; When food distribution and/or food pricing was an entrenched 
political issue (i.e. when perceived as a ‘vote-winner’ or food 
insecurity as driving political instability), and when food distribution 
schemes were highly institutionalised and resistant to change (i.e. 
path dependent)31 42 52 53 59 78; When food systems were orientated 
towards the production and distribution of single commodities (e.g. 
rice in Bangladesh, maize in Zambia) thus creating powerful electoral 
constituencies resisting nutrition-sensitive policy change20 38 78; Over-
emphasis on agricultural commercialisation, cash-cropping and/or 
export markets (i.e. productivism) to the neglect of local social 
considerations and nutritional needs.36 38 
 
Knowledge, evidence and framing 
Irrespective of issue or country context the availability of credible indicators and data systems (Factor 
12) was critical to enabling commitment by informing problem identification (i.e. demonstrating the 
changing prevalence and distribution of malnutrition), policy development, monitoring and calibration 
activities, the development of internal frame alignment (i.e. a shared discourse) within NANs, and as a 
foundation for effective financing and accountability systems.12 15 20 21 30-32 37 41 42 46 54 57 58 64 65 67 69 74 76 80 
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91 Data demonstrating ‘policy success’ enabled successful advocacy efforts for sustaining long-term 
commitment.18 54 58 62 91 Insufficient data and weak data systems were, however, reported in many 
studies30 31 34 35 38 42 47 51 52 54 71 86 87 93, often resulting from the limited capacities, resources and incentives 
of nutrition actors to collect, analyse and disseminate data.20 38 54 56 77 79 94 
Evidence demonstrating the causes and consequences of malnutrition and the efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of interventions (Factor 13), helped to support effective advocacy and policy activities 
when available, clearly communicated and accepted.21 39 41 43 57 58 61 70 74 This was more likely when 
evidence was communicated via ‘knowledge-brokers’30 56 66 77 96 in language policy-makers understand38 
77 96, by using communicative devices (e.g. country profiles, short briefs, nutrition maps)21 77, and when 
authoritative bodies were commissioned to gather, integrate and report evidence.39 47 61 The perception 
that evidence was lacking, inconsistent or unconvincing was frequently reported.12 31 32 38 40 46 47 51 54 66 71 
77 80 84 87 96 Although in some studies a strong international evidence-base supported country-level 
activities30 47 54 56 57 74, many reported an absence of locally-relevant evidence and/or the perception that 
international/national evidence was inapplicable to national/sub-national contexts.30 31 35 42 47 51 54 71 86 87 
Higher evidential requirements were required to inform policy decisions when issues were strongly 
contested, as in the case of food regulations targeting obesity prevention.32 46 49 87 
NANs that were unified around a common problem definition, causal interpretation and set of proposed 
solutions (Factor 14) were more likely to overcome ideological differences, appease powerful ‘veto 
players’ and undertake effective collective action.15 29 37 39 41 42 54 57 60 65 69 77 This was more likely when 
NANs had established structures (e.g. governance bodies, conferences, workshops, informal 
networking events) for sharing information, recruiting and socializing new members, building 
consensus and managing conflicts20 29 37 39 44 51 57 62 63 65, leadership20 51 58, strategic capacities (i.e. soft 
skills) for building consensus and managing conflicts42 51 54 58, and credible data, evidence and/or a 
shared causal framework (e.g. UNICEF nutrition framework) to support a unifying discourse.20 51 58 The 
failure to achieve this ‘internal frame alignment’ was reported in many cases12 21 31 32 38 50-53 58 62 66 76 78 86-
88 97 and resulted more often from normative conflicts (e.g. divergent interests, organizational mandates, 
administrative systems, or professional cultures) rather than technical ones.18 29 31 42 51 62 72 Although there 
were many topics of disagreement within NANs20 42 51, distrust and disagreement regarding the private 
sector’s role in nutrition policy was most common.12 30 31 43 51 54 82 97 
Certain public portrayals (i.e. frames) used by nutrition actors to attribute causality, responsibility, 
severity, tractability and benefit to an issue were found to resonate strongly with external audiences and 
thus enable commitment.14 17 32 35 Common frames identified are described in Table 6. This ‘external 
frame resonance’ (Factor 14) was more likely when messages were aligned with the underlying values 
and beliefs of policy decision-makers7 32 44 57 81 including their perceptions of technical and political 
feasibility12 18 31 44, when NANs argued behind closed-doors and spoke with a ‘common voice’20 42 57, 
and when messages were strategically tailored to align with the priorities, interests, and needs of target 
audiences.7 63 81 86 96 ‘Hooking’ nutrition onto high priority non-nutrition issues (i.e. frame expansion) 
was also found to successfully enable ‘nutrition success without nutrition commitment’ by sensitising 
broader policy agendas (e.g. national development agendas, poverty reduction initiatives, school 
feeding programmes) to nutrition objectives.20 21 41 42 62 69 
Table 6. Frames identified in the literature 
Type Identified examples 
Frames generating 
attention and/or 
enabling commitment 
An economic rationale for intervention including costs to national health systems, 
economic development and productivity32 38 40 71 97; Vulnerability of children to 
malnutrition31 32 39 81; The human right to food and health12 20 31 59 65; International 
comparisons highlighting the particular severity of malnutrition in a country12; Food 
industry demonization32; Increasing use of an obesogenic environment frame locating 
responsibility with the ‘causes of the causes’ of obesity and thus with a wider diversity of 
actors beyond the individual19 32 39; When societal conditions and focusing events (e.g. 
14 
 
drought, HIV/AIDS, health system reforms) provided an opportunity for strategically 
sensitising broader policy discourses to nutrition.42  
Oppositional frames 
(overweight/obesity) 
Emphasis on individual/parental responsibility over governmental and industry 
responsibility, portraying scientific evidence as contested or inconclusive32 33 46 83; The 
‘singling-out’ of processed foods or beverages for intervention as unfair32 43 81 97; Food 
regulation as undermining commercial viability32 43 66; Government as a ‘nanny’ when 
intervening to address obesogenic food environments.19 32 45 49 81 
 
Capacities and resources 
NANs possessing strategic capacities (Factor 16), described as “a body of craft knowledge with 
considerable practical utility”42, pS63, were more capable of building cohesive NANs, responding to 
opportunities and countering threats, and managing complex political and policy processes15 18 42 57 58 60 
61 65 67 91 At the individual level this included certain attributes of nutrition leaders (see Factor 2) and at 
the institutional level the capacity for building consensus, managing conflicts and developing 
competencies29 37 42 44 51 57 58 62 63, establishing and maintaining strategic multi-stakeholder partnerships 
(i.e. coalition-building)20 21 44 54 58 60 70 and undertaking strategic communication. The latter included the 
capacity to negotiate, compromise and tailor messages to different audiences7 18 20 42 44 50 65 67, advocate 
for incremental/realistic changes aligned with decision-maker priorities21 29 41 57 62 81 86, and to utilise 
champions with direct access to policymakers20 55 57 60 62. In several studies, weak strategic capacities 
was reported as problematic.12 18 31 32 38 50 
Limited organizational capacities (Factor 17) frequently undermined commitment by constraining the 
effective management of nutrition policy responses and increasing the likelihood of policy failure (thus 
trapping nutrition within a ‘low-priority cycle’). This was most evident in cases where competent 
nutrition professionals and administrative staff were lacking, especially at the local-level18 20 35 38 54 56 57 
60 71 75 78 79 92 94, when there was a high turnover of ministers or administrative staff and/or disruptive 
administrative restructuring12 18 38 56 58 77, limited technical capacities particularly for multi-sectoral/-
level data collection, management and analysis20 38 54 56 77 79 94, when high administrative loads were 
placed upon weak coordinating agencies and other relevant institutions20 44 52 65 71 76 78 79, and when absent 
or weak budgeting, record-keeping and accounting capacities undermined financial planning, 
programming efficiency and accountability.20 44 71 76 78 79 
The expansion of nutrition budgetary commitments and effective financing systems (Factor 18) enabled 
commitment by empowering coordinating agencies and institutional systems, enabling effective policy 
implementation, and by creating entitlements among parliamentarians, bureaucrats and citizens.20 21 31 
39 74 75 Performance and/or results-based budgeting was effective at incentivising multi-sector/-level 
cooperation, improving the transparency and accountability of institutional systems, and enhancing the 
efficiency of programming activities.20 21 31 37 74 More generally, accountability was enhanced when there 
were transparent financing and accounting systems for tracking disbursements.20 38 44 52 79 94 In many 
cases, inadequate financial resources or the failure to effectively utilise existing resources led to poor 
implementation outcomes and policy failure.18 20 38 44 52-54 57 60 62 70 71 75 76 78 79 91 92 94 Financing activities 
were undermined by a limited capacity of sub-national implementation partners to utilise or reciprocate 
funding from central government12 20 70, the absence of nutrition line items in government budgets or 
the nesting of nutrition within budgets for non-mandated departments or issues71 75 79 and when siloed 
financing arrangements encouraged inter-agency competition and disincentivised cooperation.18 34 44 52 
54 94 
DISCUSSION  
We used a theoretically driven review method to identify the determinants of political commitment for 
nutrition at the country-level. Overall, we identified and described 18 factors organized into five themes: 
actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; knowledge, evidence and framing; and capacities 
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and resources. Many of the identified factors have been described previously in the literature on 
nutrition’s ‘political economy’. The results affirm the findings of reviews on undernutrition in low and 
middle-income countries,8 9 12 and on nutrition and obesity in middle and high-income countries.11 98 
Similar themes have been found in global and supra-national studies.90 99 We have, however, extended 
this work in two notable ways.  
First, we integrated the nutrition politics and policy literature relevant to ‘malnutrition in all its forms’, 
thus spanning all issues and country-contexts. Although the included studies were not always directly 
comparable (due to differences in study design, theoretical focus and methods used), many of the 
determinants of political commitment were similar across issues and contexts. Irrespectively, effective 
nutrition actor networks, strong leadership, civil society mobilization, supportive political 
administrations, changing societal conditions and focusing events, cohesive and resonant framing, and 
data systems and evidence were commitment drivers.  
There were some notable exceptions, likely reflecting the focus of distinct bodies of researchers working 
in different country-contexts. For example, factors within the ‘institutions’ and ‘capacities and 
resources’ themes were almost exclusively reported in low and middle-income country studies, 
although these are very likely to be important in high-income countries. Private sector interference was 
reported as impeding policy responses to obesity and diet-related NCDs exclusively in upper-middle 
and high-income countries. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that addressing ‘malnutrition in all its 
forms’ is likely to require some ‘core’ types of commitment-building activities, but with some context-
dependent adaptations.  
Second, previous reviews have listed and described relevant factors but have not elaborated on their 
interactions nor elaborated significantly on the role of context. Our results demonstrate that the 
determinants of political commitment for nutrition are strongly interdependent, context-dependent and 
dynamic, thus demonstrating systems-like features. This supports the need and provides a foundation 
for understanding the drivers of political commitment, and arguably the political economy of nutrition 
more generally, within a non-linear and dynamic model of change.20 Qualitative system-dynamics 
modelling could be used to generate such a model and elaborate on the functioning of ‘nutrition 
systems’. In this perspective, the effects of interactions among factors are likely to be significantly 
greater than the sum of their individual effects in isolation.100  
Future research directions 
Although in recent decades a rich and growing literature on the political economy of nutrition has 
emerged, many evidence gaps remain. We explore a small number of these in the following section. 
Theoretically, the broad repertoire of frameworks, theories and models used across the literature has 
provided multiple lenses through which to understand this complex topic. Arguably, studies using 
comprehensive and theoretically pluralistic frameworkse.g. 15 20 38 have generated deeper insights into the 
functioning of ‘nutrition systems’ as a whole than those focused on certain facets (e.g. framing) or 
policy process stages (e.g. agenda-setting). Overall, we found the theory-driven framework synthesis 
method well suited to our aim of understanding a complex political phenomenon. However, empirical 
evidence in theoretically guided research is always generated, at least to some extent, by the theory 
itself. Thus, we may have missed important drivers of political commitment because they have been 
under-theorised and thus underreported in the literature. Indeed, important approaches in political 
science (e.g. new institutionalism) are largely absent and provide avenues for guiding future 
investigation.  
Substantively, there are many research questions in need of answers of which some – given their cross-
cutting nature – are arguably most important. Several concern nutrition actor networks. How do such 
networks form, evolve and become effective? What pragmatic actions can be taken to rapidly enhance 
their effectiveness within countries? Several institutionalised belief systems (e.g. food-bias, nutri-
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centrism) are strong commitment barriers. Why have these become institutionalised in some 
jurisdictions but not others? How might these be countered? Very few studies have focused on the 
reality that NANs concerned with obesity tend to be different to those concered with undernutrition. 
What opportunitiesdoes bringing together people and entities concerned with different forms of 
malnutrition present for furthering committment to nutrition, especially as new institutional systems 
and policies for tackling overweight/obesity and diet-related NCDs are layered onto existing ones for 
undernutrition? The role of parliamentarians is also underexplored20. How can non-partisan support for 
nutrition be attained and sustained more systematically at this level? Private sector interference is 
reported to have strongly impeded commitment for overweight/obesity and diet-related NCD 
prevention. How can NANs more effectively counteract this interference, while recognising that the 
private sector will inevitably have to be involved in delivering on objectives? 
CONCLUSION  
In this review we asked: what factors generate, sustain and constrain political commitment for nutrition 
at national and sub-national levels, how, and under what circumstances? Our aim was to inform strategic 
actions for building commitment over the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition. Overall, 18 
factors were identified organized into five themes: actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; 
knowledge, evidence and framing; and capacities and resources. The results demonstrate that the 
processes driving commitment are multi-factorial, dynamic and strongly context-dependent. 
Furthermore, commitment is not something that simply exists or emerges accidentally; it can be created 
and strengthened over time through strategic action.9  
Many of the divers of political commitment are similar irrespective of country-context or nutrition issue, 
but with some notable exceptions. This suggests that effective commitment-building strategies are 
likely to involve a set of ‘core actions’ but with some context-dependent adaptations. The main core 
action identified through this study is sustained commitment-building actions by cohesive, responsive 
and strongly-led nutrition actor networks. Accelerating the development of such networks should be a 
core task for all actors involved, including international development partners. To achieve their goals, 
nutrition actor networks should aim to enrol the support of political leaders, parliamentarians and 
administrative elites, and mobilize civil society coalitions. To sustain commitment, they must establish 
empowered institutions, develop organizational and strategic capacities, generate commitment among 
implementation partners at all levels, and mobilize the financial resources to do so.  
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